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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONNA McBROOM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD KIRTLEY 
M·cBROOM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9702 
Defendant's Answering· Brief to Plaintiff's Brief 
on Plaintiff's Appeal from the Order of the 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
vVe do not ag·ree with plaintiff, Monna Mc-
Broom's, statement of flacts set forth in plaintiff's 
brief with respect to the appeal by plaintiff from 
the order entered by Judge Marcellus K. Snow on 
the 19th day of July, 1962. 
The trial court entered its findings of fact 
and decree of divorce, from vvhich defendant, Howard 
Kirtley :rvicBroon1, is appealing to this court, on 
~-\.pril 23, 1962. (R. 38-44.) On June 25, 1962, de-
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fendant was forced to move the trial court for an 
order, pending this appeal, fixing defendant's rights 
of visitation, restraining plaintiff from punishing 
the children for visiting their father, restraining 
plaintiff from attempting to degrade their father 
in the minds of the children and from 1attempting 
to alienate the children, and restraining plaintiff 
from removing the children from the State of Utah, 
• (R. 92-97) because plaintiff had repeatedly and 
persistently denied defendant rights of visitation 
of the children, punished the children for visiting 
defendant, used the children ~and refused defendant 
his rights of visitation in attempts to extort money 
from defendant, threatened to remove the children 
from the State of Utah if the defendant continued 
to prosecute this appeal and a suit against Bertram 
James J1a.rvis for criminal conversation with plain-
tiff, and plaintiff had continued to visit neglect 
and moral depravity upon the children since the 
trial. (R. 95-97.) Plaintiff filed a counter-petition 
in which plaintiff agreed to submit the matter of 
visitation to the court ( R. 98) , and sought to hold 
defendant in contempt on ~a false claim that de-
fendant was behind one month in payment of sup-
port money, and to restrain defendant from com-
ing on the premises of the home of the parties at 
583 Cortez Street except to exercise his rights of 
visitation of the minor children. ( R. 98-101.) A 
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hearing was had on this matter on July 9 and July 
11, 1962. (R. 582-674.) The trial court, Judge M1ar-
cellus K. Snow presiding, found all of the issues in 
favor of defendant (R. 78-81), and on July 19, 1962, 
entered an order granting defendant rights of visi-
tation and issued restraining orders to guarantee 
enforcement, and thereupon awarded pl,aintiff a 
judgment against defendant in the sum of $125.00 
for attorneys fees in connection with this hearing. 
(R. 82-84.) Plaintiff thereupon proceeded to violate 
the court's order (R. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691), 
and defendant was again required to bring plain-
tiff into ·court on contempt ch1arges (R. 114-115) 
before Judge A. H. Ellett on the 27th day of July, 
1962, (R. 675-691) in order to procure enforce-
ment of the order. (R. 675-691, 127-129.) 
Plaintiff appeals to this court from the order 
of Judge Snow, and defendant cross-appeals from 
that part of the order awarding plaintiff the addi-
tional $125.00 attorneys fees. The parties stipu-
lated in this court that defendant's appeal from the 
decree of divorce and plaintiff's appeal from the 
order of Judge Snow entered on July 19, 1962, 
may be consolidated for purposes of hearing in 
this court. 
The evidence at the hearing before Judge Snow 
was as follows. 
Under the decree of divorce entered on April 
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23, 1962, the trial court erroneously granted custody 
of the minor children to plaintiff. The court did, 
however, grant defendant the right of reasonable 
visitation. ( R. 38-44.) 
Between the time of trial of the divorce action 
on March 13, 1962, and the date of the hearing be-
fore Judge Snow on July 9, 1962, plaintiff continu-
'ally refused to permit defendant to visit the children 
except on certain Sunday afternoons between the 
hours of 12:00 o'clock Noon and 7:30 o'clock P.M. 
On those occasions defendant never knew whether 
he would have the cildren or not because, when he 
requested visitation, plaintiff would answer equi-
vocally and say, "you come by on Sunday at noon." 
(R. 588, 597, 611.) 
During the five month period between the time 
that defendant moved out of the home of the parties 
on January 31, 1962, (R. 11-12, 198, 477) and the 
date of the hearing before Judge Snow, plaintiff 
only permitted defendant to have the children with 
him overnight on one occasion, to-wit, on May 25, 
1962, although defendant had continually requested 
that plaintiff permit him to have the children with 
him overnight. ( R. 585-588, 598.) 
During the period subsequent to the trial of 
this action plaintiff has used the children and re-
fused defendant his rights of visitation in efforts 
to extort n1oney from defendan!t. ( R. 588-592.) 
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On Saturday, March 24, 1962, plaintiff told defen-
dant that he could not visit with the children on the 
following Sunday afternoon unless the defendant 
paid her $25.00 so that she could pay a water bill. 
Defendant had previously on two occasions given 
her money to pay this bill. Defendant replied to the 
plaintiff, "I am not going to buy my children.'' 
Plaintiff said, "Then you won't see them." Defen-
dant pointed out to plaintiff that she was using the 
children and that it was not good for them, and 
plaintiff replied that it was not good for him either. 
(R. 588-589.) On the following day, Sunday, March 
25, 1962, plaintiff had the little girl, age 6, and the 
little boy, age 8, call the defendant on the telephone 
and tell him that the plaintiff said he could have 
them that 1aiternoon if he would pay the plaintiff 
$25.00. Plaintiff broke in on the conversation and 
told the little gir I to tell her father to bring the 
money in cash. The little gir I was crying and the 
little boy was very upset. They pleaded with their 
father to pay $25.00 in cash to the plaintiff so that 
they could be with him for an afternoon. The defen-
dant explained to the children that it would not be 
right for hi1n to pay money in order to see his chil-
dren. The plaintiff, n1other, then broke in on the 
conversation again a11d said to the children concern-
ing their father, "The son-of-a-bitch wants the water 
turned off and he wants to hurt tls all that he pes-
~) 
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sibly can." (R. 589-59'2.) Plaintiff on the witness 
stand in the hearing before Judge Snow admitted 
that she refused to let defen,dant have the children 
on this occasion because he would not pay her the 
money that she demanded. She did not deny the 
cruelty 1a.nd moral depravity visited on the children 
on this occasion. ( R. 628.) On another occasion 
plaintiff demanded that defendant pay her $200.00. 
Defendant replied that he was mailing the $200.00 
to the clerk of the district court that day. Plaintiff 
then said, "If it isn't in there when I say it is going 
to be in there, then you won't see the children." 
(R. 59'3.) 
Plaintiff used the children, and denied defen-
dant his rights of visitation, and threatened to re-
move the children from the State of Utah and never 
permit defendant to see the children again, if de-
fendant continued to prosecute his appeal to this 
court from the decree of divorce entered by Judge 
Jeppson in this action. She also Yisited the same 
misconduct and cruelty upon the children and n1ade 
the same threats if defendant continued to prose-
cute an 'action for criminal conversation against 
Bert Jarvis in connection vvith his and plaintiff's 
adulterous activities. Just prior to Memorial Day, 
May 28, 1962, defendant called plaintiff and re-
quested visitation of the children over the holiday. 
Plaintiff then asked defendant if he was going to 
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continue the adultery suit against Bert Jarvis and 
whether defendant was going to appeal to this court 
from the decree of divorce. Defendant replied that 
he was. Plaintiff thereupon refused to grant defen-
dant permission to see the children over Memorial 
Day and refused to permit him to visit the children 
for three weeks thereafter. ( R. 592-593, 614.) In 
the same conversation plaintiff told defendant that, 
if he continued with the lawsuit against Jarvis or 
with ·his appeal, she would take the children out of 
the state and he would never see them ·again. She 'also 
said that, when she got through with the children, 
they would never speak to their father. (R. 593.) 
Since the trial of the divorce action plaintiff 
has beaten and punished the children for visiting 
'\Vith their father during periods when she was not 
permitting them to see their father at all. On one 
occasion defendant picked up the children after 
school and notified the plaintiff that he would re-
turn them to the home between 6:30 and 7:00 
o'clock P.M. When the defendant took the children 
home, plaintiff slapped the little boy in the face 
and hit the little girl and caused her to fall down 
on the floor. ( R. 605.) On another occasion defen-
dant found his little boy riding his bicycle on the 
State Capitol grounds. When defendant approached 
the little boy, the little boy was terrified. His father 
told the little boy that he only wanted to talk to the 
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little boy for a few minutes. The little boy replied 
that he was afraid because he would get beaten by 
the plaintiff if he got in the defendant's car. The 
defendant suggested that they go call the plaintiff 
on the telephone and ask if they could play for twenty 
or thirty minutes. T'hey did so. In the conversation 
the plaintiff said to the little boy, "If you're not 
home in five minutes I'm going to hit you six times 
with a stick instead of five." Thereafter the defen-
dant let his little boy go home. ( R. 604-605.) Defen-
dant pointed out to plaintiff the damage she was 
doing to the children by punishing t'hem for asso-
ciating with him. Plaintiff in the conversation ad-
mitted that she punished the children for associat-
ing with their father. (R. 606.) Plaintiff also ad-
mitted on cross-examination that she punished the 
!children for associatin·g with their father. (R. 645-
646.) The defendant testified as to the effect on the 
children of this conduct of the plaintiff. A week 
before the hearing before Judge Snow defendant 
went to see the children at a baby tenders. The little 
boy said, "What do you want, what do you want? 
I don't want to see you.'' The boy then explained 
that he did not want to see his father because he 
would get hurt by the plaintiff. ( R. 606.) 
Plaintiff has repeatedly since the trial of this 
action attempted to poison the minds of the children 
against their father and to alienate their affection 
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for him. She told the defendant that, when she got 
through with the 'children, they would never speak 
to him again. ( R. 593, 606.) She berated the little 
girl to the point of tears because the little girl only 
gave her a homemade Mother's Day card and no 
other present on Mother's Day and then said to the 
little girl, "It's your father's fault and your fault. 
And you remember all those other little ~children 
that brought presents for their mother, but not 
you." When defendant confronted plaintiff with 
this incident, she replied, "So what." (R. 603.) She 
referred to 'the defendant as a son-of-a-bitch and 
told the children that he wanted to hurt them all 
he could. (R. 591.) Plaintiff testified as a conclu-
sion over objection tha:t she never degraded the de-
fendant in the eyes of the children. (R. 6'27-628, 
Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the order of Judge 
Snow, (p. 9.) In the If ace of the uncontroverted facts, 
plaintiff's notions as Ito what is degrading do not 
conform to ordinary standards. 
The eviden'ce at the hearing before Judge Snow 
was that, subsequent to the trial of this action, the 
children were left at the homes of baby tenders all 
day while the plaintiff was working and even for 
extended periods when she was not working, rather 
than in the care of the defendant and their blood 
relatives. (R. 650, 610, 599.) Defendant at the hear-
ing offered to care for the children at all times, with 
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his mother, Mrs. R. A. McBroom, and other compe-
tent help, when plaintiff was unable to care for 
them. (R. 619.) Plaintiff on the witness stand ad-
mitted, !as she had done at the trial before Judge 
Jeppson ( R. 205, 234-235, 250, 273), that the de-
fendant was a good father. (R. 653-654.) On cross-
examination she refused his offer to care for the 
children when she was unable to do so. She gave as 
her reason that it was dam'aging to the children 
even though he was a good father. When pressed for 
an explanation as to why it was damaging, she 
replied that it was bad for the children because he 
gave them presents, such as a race bug for his little 
boy and he spent $41.00 on an outing for the children 
on one Sunday. ('R. 649-6'50, 654.) For extended 
periods plaintiff hid the 'children from their father 
in the home of a strange baby tender. (R. 599.) 
Defendant was required to S1hadow her in order to 
learn of their whereabouts so that he could be advised 
as to their care and welfare. ( R. 599.) On the 
little boy's birthday, June 8th, plaintiff refused to 
permit the children to be with their father and in-
stead left them ·all d~ay at a baby tender's home. 
(R. 598-600, 631-632.) The defen:dant went anyway 
and visited his little boy at \the baby tenders for 
two hours on his birthday. (R. 599-600.) On the 
witness stand the plaintiff admitted that she refused 
to permit the children to see their father on the 
10 
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following Sunday because he ha,d gone and seen the 
little boy at the baby tender's on his birthday. (R. 
();)1-632.) On Saturday, June 9, plaintiff refused to 
permit the children to go fishing with their fa:ther. 
Instead she sent the little boy fishing with a strange 
neighbor, whom the defendant had only seen on one 
occasion. · ( R. 600, 631-632.) On certain occasions 
subsequent to the trial of this action the children 
have been left alone and comple1tely unattended. On 
one occasion defendant called the home of a baby 
tender where he knew the children to be staying. The 
little girl answered the telep·hone. s~he was crying 
and afraid because there was no one in the horne 
except an infant child of the baby tender. The de-
fendant theretlpon went to the baby tender's home 
and cared for the child. (R. 611-612.) The children 
on one occasion contracted measles. The plaintiff 
refused to permit the children to stay with their 
father and instead left them during this period in 
the home of a baby tender. (R. 630.) On another 
occasion defen;dant went to the home of a baby tender 
and found the little girl running the streets alone 
in the neighborhood be'cause the baby tender was 
not at the home. ( R. 611-612.) 
Since the trial of the divorce action plaintiff 
has continued to use obscene language and visit 
moral depravity upon the children. Specifically she 
and her mother taught the little girl, age 6, and the 
11 
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little boy, !age 8, two filthy jokes, one that had as 
the punch line, "Bitch, Bitch, Bitch," and another 
t'hat ended with, "Jesus Christ shit his pants." (R. 
613-614.) We regret the necessity of printing this 
material. However, the urgency of the situation with 
referen·ce to the children before this court compels 
us to do so. This type of profanity is not the result 
of bitterness arising from a divorce action. It is 
the deliberate visitation of immorality upon children. 
On direct examination by her own counsel 
plaintiff testified that she had never told the child-
ren any dirty jokes. ( R. 3 7.) On cross-examination 
by defendant's counsel plaintiff reiterated the de-
nial. (R. 63'9.) S'he was thereupon asked, as she 
had been asked at the trial of the divorce action, 
whether or not she had ever engaged in a conversa-
tion with defendant and the children in which she 
said, "Play with your teats, Howard. Are they grow-
ing. Look, Lisa, he is rubbing his teats." Twice un-
der oath at the hearing before Judge Snow she 
categorically denied, as she had done at the trial 
before Judge Jeppson ( R. 254), that any such con-
versation ever occurred. ( R. 639-641.) She then 
stated under oath, as she had done at the trial be-
fore Judge Jeppson (R. 255-261), that she did not 
want the recording of this conversation played for 
the court. ( R. 644.) Thereafter the hearing before 
Judge Snow was adjot1rned. (R. 665-666.) Plain-
12 
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tiff had again committed perjury with reference 
to her direct visitation of moral depravity upon the 
children. (See defendant's brief on appeal from the 
decree of divorce, pp. 23-24.) On the following day, 
July 10, 1962, plaintiff and her counsel found it 
necessary to move the court to re-open the hearing 
before Judge 'Snow to correct her perjure:d testi-
mony. The court ordered the hearing reopened for 
the limited purpose of taking plaintiff's testimony 
with reference to this matter. (R. 110-111.) On 
July 11, 1962, plaintiff again appeared before Judge 
Snow ~and admitted that the conversation had oc-
curred between herself, the two children and Mr. 
McBroom and that Exhibit 17 was a true and cor-
rect transcript of the conversation. (Ex. 17, R. 667-
668.) It is again apparent that plaintiff is the type 
of woma.n that can come into court with a straight 
face and deny her insidious conduct with reference 
to the children; but, when confronted with specific 
proof, she is forced to admit the depravity visited 
upon them. 
At the hearing before Judge Snow and on this 
appeal from Judge Snow's order plaintiff has as-
serted as an excuse for prohibiting the children from 
being with their father over week-ends and, in par-
ticular, on Sunday mornings, that she wanted to 
take the children to the L.D.S. Church herself on 
Sunday mornings. (R. 627, Plaintiff's brief on ap-
13 
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peal from the order of Judge Snow, p. 12.) The un-
controverted evidence at the trial of the divorce ac-
tion before Judge Jeppson was that defendant al-
ways took the children to the Presbyterian Church, 
pursuant to an agreement of the parties that the 
children would be raised in the Presbyterian Church, 
and that defendant attended church with the1n !and 
plaintiff did not except on rare occasions. (R. 482-
484, 564, 607-609.) At the trial plaintiff was forced 
to admit that on one occasion she was consorting 
on Sunday morning with a married man in an 
apartment on the west side of Salt Lake City while 
'her children were attending church with her hus-
band. (R. 303.) The fact that the plaintiff and her 
attorney are raising a religious issue before this 
court is, in the light of pl,aintiff's conduct and stan-
dards of immorality, fantastic. At the hearing be-
fore Judge Snow on cross examination plaintiff 
admitted that she had not attended the L.D.S. 
Church with the children every Sunday since the 
trial of the 'action and, when pressed on the issue, 
she admitted that she did not even know what Sun-
day school class she was in or the name of the 
teacher of the class. ( R. 653.) 
Plaintiff asserted at the hearing before Judge 
Snow !a,nd now asserts in her appeal from the order 
of Judge Snow that she has been entirely reasonable 
in permitting defendant to visit the children since 
14 
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the trial of the divorce action. In support of this 
assertion, plaintiff testified in detail at the hearing, 
and set out in plaintiff's brief on !appeal from the 
order of Judge Snow in detail, the times when de-
fendant had visited the children since the trial of 
the divorce action. (R. 628-632, Plaintiff's brief 
on appeal from the order of Judge Snow, pp. 4-5.) 
From this, plaintiff argues in the brief that, "the 
plaintiff's testimony in detail is set forth in the 
statement of facts showing the times and places 
when defendant had taken the children prior to the 
hearing before Judge Snow, ~and base,d thereon, cer-
tainly defendant could h~ave no reasonable grounds 
upon which to complain that he was being denied 
visitation." (Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the 
order of Judge Snow, p. 11.) This is a deliberate 
and dishonest attempt on the p·art of the plaintiff 
to mislead this court. The uncontroverted facts are 
that, when defendant has visited the children sub-
sequent to the trial, defendant has been forced to 
do so over the protest and wifuout the consent of 
plaintiff under circumstances in whi'ch plaintiff was 
using the children in an effort to extort money from 
the defendant, punishing them and visiting cruelty 
upon them for seeing their father, and visiting im-
Inorality and neglect upon them. (R. 614, 585-588, 
598, 611, 589-592, 628, 593, 592-593, 614, 645-646.) 
The evidence at the hearing before Judge Snow 
15 
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was that defendant had not touche'd the plaintiff 
since prior to the divorce action ( R. 616), that 
defenaant had never threatened to beat plaintiff 
( R. 620), and that defendant had not gone on the 
premises of the parties since the divorce action 
except for the purpose of carrying the children up 
to the door ~and leaving them after visitation (R. 614-
616), and there was no evidence that defendant had 
harrassed plaintiff while at work. 
The hearing before Judge Snow was held on 
July 9, 1962. Defendant was not in default, much 
less in contempt of court, for failure to pay sup-
port money. (Ex. D-A1, R. 621-623.) 
Judge Marcellus K. Snow found all of the is-
sues in favor of defendant (R. 78-81), and on July 
19, 1962, entered an order granting defend'ant rights 
of visitation and issued restraining orders to guar-
antee enforcement. (R. 82-84.) Specifically Judge 
Snow found the following. ( 1) That since the trial 
of the divorce action plaintiff had repeatedly and 
persistently denied defenda.nt his rights of visita-
tion of his minor children and plaintiff had used 
the children and refused defendant his right of visi-
tation for the purpose of attempting to force de-
fendant to pay money to plaintiff. (2) That plain-
tiff since the trial of the divorce action had repeat-
edly attempted to alienate the affections of the 
children for defendant and attempted to degrade 
16 
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defendant in the minds of the children. (3) That 
plaintiff had threatened to remove the children from 
the State of Utah and never permit defendant to see 
his children again. ( 4) That defendant had paid 
plaintiff all sums of money due and owing for sup-
port under the decree of divorce and that defendant 
was current in his payments of support money and 
not in contempt of the court in connection therewith. 
( 5) 'That defendant had not, since the trial of the 
divorce action, gone on the premises at '583 Cortez 
Street except for the purpose of delivering the 
children to the doorstep of the home after visiting 
with the children and that defendant had not abused 
or molested the plaintiff. ( R. 78-81.) Judge Snow 
thereupon entered an order fixing the times of 
visitation and restraining plaintiff from using the 
children and denying defendant rights of visitation 
for the purpose of attempting to force defendant 
to pay money to plaintiff and restraining plaintiff 
from taking the children out of the State of U'tah 
for a period in excess of 30 days without express 
permission of the court, first ·had and obtained, 
on notice to defendant and a hearing thereon. Judge 
Snow further ordered plaintiff to disclose to de-
fendant the location of any home in which the child-
ren might be staying and the telephone number of 
such home. He turther provided in his order that 
defendant was current in his payments of support 
17 
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money and tha:t the next payment was to be made 
during the month of July, 1962. He thereupon 
awarded plaintiff a judgment against defendant in 
the sum of $125.00 for attorney fees in connection 
with this hearing. (R. 82-84.) 
Defendant testified at the hearing before Judge 
Snow that, when plaintiff denied him the right to 
visit ·his little boy on his birthday, 'he told plain tiff 
he was going to ~apply to the court to define what 
reasonable visitation was; and, that plaintiff re-
plied, "I don't care what the court says. I am going 
to do as I please." (R. 598-599.) Plaintiff's attorney 
~asked plaintiff at the hearing before Judge Snow 
whether she ever told defendant that she would not 
live up to the order of fue court. Plaintiff replied 
that She, "never, never did." ( R. 638.) She there-
upon proceeded to violate the order of Judge Snow 
(R. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691) and defendant was 
again forced to bring plaintiff into court on con-
tempt charges (R. 114-115) before Judge A. H. 
Ellett on the 27th day of July, 1962, (R. 675-691) 
in order to procure enforcement of Judge Snow's 
order. (R. 675-691, 127-129.) Judge Ellett ordered 
plaintiff to comply with the order of Judge Snow 
and required her to make up for her previous viola-
tions. (R. 127-129.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ER'R IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR 
$200.00 DELINQUENT SUPPORT MONEY. 
Plaintiff, in her counterpetition before Judge 
Snow, claimed that defendant was behind one month 
in payment of support money as of the date of the 
hearing on July 9, 196'2, and sought to hold defen-
dant in contempt of court ·by reason of the alleged 
delinquency !and sought a judgment against defen-
dant for $200.00 delinquent support money. The 
decree of divorce was entered on the 23rd day of 
April, 1962. Paragraph No. 3 of the decree provided 
as follows: "Defendant is hereby ordered to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month for each of 
said minor children; for their support and main-
tenance; * * * Baid payments to commen·ce as of the 
23rd day of March, 1962, * * *." ( R. 4'2-44.) 
Mter defendant discovered the contents of 
plaintiff's diary and shorthand notes, defendant, in 
order to obtain an immediate and speedy trial of 
the divorce action, moved out of the home pursura.nt 
to the stipulation dated January 31, 1962, to the 
effect that defendant's so doing would be without 
prejudice to his rights. (R. 11-12, 198, 477.) Pur-
suant to the stipulation defendant agreed to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $200.00 for the month of Feb-
ruary, 1962, and $200.00 for the month of M·arch, 
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1962, pending a decision in the divorce action, which 
was set down for trial on March 13, 1962. (R. 18, 
621.) Defendant expressly conditioned payment of 
the $'200.00 on plaintiff's signing and returning 
the stipulation to defendant as set forth on the re-
ceipt dated February 2, 1962, for payment of the 
first $200.00. (Ex. D-A1.) The admitted facts are 
that, pursuant to the stipulation and the decree of 
divorce1 defendant had made the following payments 
to plaintiff since defendant moved out of the home 
of the parties: $'200.00 on February 2, 1962, for 
the month of February as evidenced by the receipt 
dated Felbruary 2, 1962; $200.00 on March 1, 1962, 
for the month of March as evidenced by the receipts 
dated March 1, 196'2; $'200 on May 2, 1962, for the 
month of April as evidenced by the check and re-
ceipt dated May 2, 1962; $200.00 on M~ay 28, 1962, 
for the month of May as evidenced by the check 
dated May 28, 196'2; and, $200.00 on June 29, 1962, 
for the month of June as evidenced by the receipt 
dated June 29, 1962. (Ex. D-A1, R. 621-623.) 
The hearing before Judge Snow was held on 
July 9, 1962. Defendant was not in default, n1uch 
less in contempt of court, for failure to pay support 
money. 
Plaintiff, in her brief on appeal from the order 
of Judge Snow, at page 10, asserts that defendant 
is not entitled to credit for any payments of sup-
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port money made prior to en try of the decree of 
divorce. The decree of divorce was entered on the 
23rd day of April, 1962, and provided for p'ayment 
of $200.00 per month commencing as of the 23rd 
day of March, 1962. The decree was entered after 
the month of March had expired. Defendant had 
already paid $200.00 for the month of March. The 
effect of pl'aintiff's assertion is that, since defendant 
cannot have credit for any payments made prior to 
entry of ~he decree and since the month of March 
had already expired at the time of entry of the de-
cree, and the decree expressly required payment of 
$200.00 for the month of March; therefore, defen-
dant must go back again after April 23rd and pay 
twice, or a total of $400.00 for the month of March, 
in which month he had already paid $200.00. This 
assertion is typical of the attitude displayed by the 
plaintiff throughout the marriage, during this liti-
gation, and subsequent to the entry of the decree of 
divorce. 
Furthermore, if we were to assume that plain-
tiff's assertion is correct to the effect that defendant 
is only entitled to credit for payments made sub-
sequent to entry of the decree of divorce, defendant 
was nevertheless not delinquent in payment of sup-
port money at the time of the hearing before Judge 
Snow on July 9th. Subsequent to the decree of di-
vorce defendant paid plaintiff $200.00 on May 2, 
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19'6'2, $200.00 on May 28, 1962, and $200.00 on 
June 29, 19'62, as evidenced by Exhibit D-A1. The 
decree of divorce entered on April 23, 1962, provid-
ed that defendant pay plaintiff $200.00 per month 
support money commencing as of the ~3rd day of 
March, 1962. The $200.00 payment made on May 
2nd may be credited for the monthly period from 
the 23rd day of March, 1962, to the 23rd day of 
April, 1962. The $200.00 payment made on May 
28th may be credited for the monthly period from 
the 23rd day of April, 1962, to the 23rd day of May, 
1962. The $200.00 payment made on June 29th may 
be credited for the monthly period from May 23, 
1H62, to June 23, 1962. At the time of the hearing 
before Judge Snow on July 9, 1962, defendant had 
until July 2'3, 19'62, in which to make the payment 
of $200.00 per month for the period from June 23, 
to July 2'3, 196~2. 
It should be noted at this time th,at the fact 
that the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum 
of $200.00 per month for the months of February 
and MarCh of 1962, prior to the trial of the divorce 
action, is not to be construed by this court as an 
admission by defen:dant that the award by the trial 
court in the decree of divorce of the sum of $200.00 
per month support money to plaintiff is reasonable 
and not excessive. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 
$200.00 per month for the months of February and 
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March of 1962 prior to trial of the divorce action 
pursuant to the stipulation dated January 31, 1962, 
in order to obtain an immediate and speedy trial in 
which defendant sought immediate custody of his 
children, and the stipulation expressly provided that 
it should be without prejudice to the rights of the 
defen~dant. 
The irresponsibility ·and dishonesty with which 
plaintiff attempts to force defendant to pay her 
$200.00 twice for the month of March, 1962, or a 
total of $400.00 for that month, is patent in the 
face of illle decree of divorce entered by Ju'dge Jepp-
son, which effeetively took from defendant his child-
ren and all of his property and left defendant with 
$56.92 per month upon which to live ~before pay-
ment of rent and federal and state income taxes. 
(See, defendant's brief on appeal from the decree 
of divorce entered by Judge Jeppson, pages 4'7-49.) 
This irresponsibility is further demonstrated by the 
fact that there appears on the check dated May 2, 
1962, in the amount of $200.00, payable to the plain-
tiff, after the signature of H·oward Kirtley Mc-
Broom, the words "McGoo vs. Magoo" in pen and 
handwriting identical to that of the endorsement 
by Monna McBroom on the reverse side of the check. 
(Ex. D~A1.) This is a serious matter. It is one more 
example of the irresponsibility and unfitness of 
plaintiff demonstrated throughout the entire record. 
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POINT 2. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO SET UP VISITATION RIGHTS FOR T'HE DE-
FENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH P'LAINTIFF'S 
ANSWER AND COUNTERPETITION. 
Judge Snow in his order granted the defendant 
the right to have the children visit with him every 
other week-end from Friday at 3:00 o'clock P.M. to 
Sunday 'at 7:30 o'clock P.M. and on the alternate 
week-ends from 9:00 o'clock A.M. to 7:30 o'clock 
P.M. on Saturday. (R. 82-84.) 
Plaintiff in her counterpetition before Judge 
Snow sought to limit defendant's rights of visita-
tion to one day every other week from 6:00 o'clock 
P.M. on Friday until 6:00 o'clock P.M. on Saturday 
and one-half a day on the alternate weeks from 1:00 
o'clock P.M. to 7:30 o'clock P.M. on Sunday after-
noons. (R. 98-101.) 
Plaintiff argues that it was unfair for Judge 
Marcellus K. Snow to substitute the court's judg-
ment for plaintiff's judgment with respect to de-
fendant's rights of visitation with his children pend-
ing this appeal. (See, plaintiff's brief on appeal 
from the order of Judge Snow, p. 13.) This asser-
tion invloves an error on a basic assumption, to-wit, 
that plaintiff is competent to formulate a ju:dgment 
as to what is in the best interest of the children in 
any respect including their relationships with their 
father. The record as to what has happened since 
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the trial of the divorce action demonstrates that 
she is not. See, Statement of Facts, s~tpra. p 1, 
et seq. 
Plaintiff asserts that the effect of Judge Snow's 
order is that she only has the children on Sunday 
every other week-end. (Plaintiff's brief on appeal 
from the order of Judge Snow, p. 7.) The effect of 
Judge Snow's order is that the defendant has the 
children with him only two days of every other 
week and one day during the daytime on the alter-
nate weeks, or a total of six days a month. 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant should be pro-
hibited from having the children on ~any full Sunday 
so that she will be able to attend to their religious 
activities. (Plaintiff's brief on. appeal from the 
order of Judge Snow, pp. 4 & 12.) This assertion 
is incomprehensible in the light of the record of 
plaintiff's conduct during the marriage ~and from 
the time of trial of the divorce action down to the 
date of the hearing before Judge Snow, s~tpra. 
p. 13, et seq. 
Plaintiff asserts that, since J u d g e Jeppson 
awarded her custody of the children, she is a fit 
and proper person to have their custody; and, there-
fore, Judge Snow erred in refusing to adopt her 
notions as to what is in the best interest of the 
children with respect to their visitation "\Vi th their 
father. (Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the order 
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of Judge Snow, p. 12.) This assertion involves an 
error on the basic assumption, to-wit, that plaintiff 
is a fit and proper person to have the care and cus-
tody of the children. The admitted facts !at the trial 
of the divorce action and the admitted facts at the 
hearing before Judge Snow demonstrate conclusively 
that she is not. See, Statements of Facts, supra. 
p. 1, et seq., ,and defendant's brief on appeal from 
the decree of divorce in which defendant is seeking 
custody of the children at this time, pp. 2-33, 39-47. 
Furthermore, this assertion involves an erroneous 
conclusion that plaintiff is capable of determining 
what is in the best interest of the children includ-
ing their relationship with their father, in the face 
of the uncontroverted evidence that since the tri'al 
of the divorce action she has ( 1) repeatedly and 
persistently denied defendant visitation, (2) refused 
to permit defendant to see the children at all over 
extended periods, ( 3) used the children in efforts 
to extort money from the defendant, ( 4) left the 
children continually with baby tenders and at times 
unprotected and un·attended, ( 5) punished the child-
ren for visiting with their father, (6) attempted to 
degrade the father in the eyes of his children and 
(7) alienate their affection for him, (8) repeatedly 
visited obscenity and moral depravity tlpon the child-
ren, and, ( 9) visited cruelty upon the children, 
supra. p. 4, et seq. 
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It must be noted at this time th,at defendant, 
pending this appeal, was forced to resort to the 
court to protect his children with respect to their visi-
tation with their father. 'The fact that defendant 
at this time is taking a position in defense of Judge 
Snow's order protecting the matter of visitation 
must not be construed by this court as a concession 
in 'aDY sense on the part of defendant that plaintiff 
should be awarded custody of the children or that 
she is a fit an·d proper person to have their custody 
and control. The admitted facts at the trial of the 
divorce action and the uncontroverted and admitted 
facts ~as to her conduct subsequent to trial of the 
divorce acti·on 'demonstrate conclusively that she 
is not and that it is in the best interest of the children 
that custody be awarded to the defendant. 
See Stuber v. Stuber (1952) 121 U. 632, 244 
P. 2d 650, in which the court awarded custody of 
the child to the wife because the evidence showed 
that, while the child was living with the hus'band, 
the husband, his mother and his second Wife were 
working and the child was required to spend ex-
tended periods of time with baby tenders; and, the 
evidence on behalf of the wife showed that the wife 
was living with her n1other, the maternal grand-
mother was not working and the maternal grand-
lnother and the wife were prepared to offer the per-
sonal care of a blood relative for the child at all 
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times. See, also, Johnson v. Johnson (1958) 7 U. 
2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16, in which the court awarded 
custody of the eight year old child to the father 
where the evidence showed that the mother was liv-
ing alone and working because it was in the best 
interest of the child. 
POINT 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM INTERFER-
ING WITH PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S JOB, ·OR 
HARRASSING THE PLAINTIFF AT HOME OR AT 
w·o,RK, ON THE TE'LE'PHONE, OR IN ANY OTHER 
MANNER, AND IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN DE-
FENDANT 'FROl\1: THREATENING PLAINTIFF VVITH 
BODILY HARM. 
Pltaintiff complains in her appeal from the 
order of Judge Snow that the court failed to re-
strain defendant from interfering with plaintiff's 
job, or harrassing plaintiff at home or at work, on 
the telep·hone, or in 'any other manner, and from 
threatening plaintiff with bodily harn1. (See plain-
ltiff's brief on appeal from the order of Judge Snow, 
pp. 2 & 13.) Plaintiff, in her counter-petition be-
fore Judge Snow, did not seek such restraining order 
and merely sought an order restraining defendant, 
''from coming on the home premises at any time 
except to exercise his rights of visitation with the 
minor children as specifically set by the court." 
(R. 100-101.) The uncontroverted evidence at the 
hearing was that defendant had not gone upon the 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pre1nises of the parties since the divorce action 
except for the purpose of carrying the children up 
to the door and leaving them after visitation. (R. 
614-616.) On one such occasion defendant did speak 
to the plaintiff and asked her if he could h~ave his 
personal effects. Plaintiff replied by thumbing her 
nose at defendant in the presence of the children. 
(R. 615.) Thlis evidence was uncontroverted. De-
fendant testified that he had never threatened to 
beat plaintiff and that he had not touc:hed her. (R. 
6'20, 616.) This evidence was uncontroverted. De-
fendant admitted on the witness stand that he 'told 
plaintiff he would use force, if necessary, to pre-
vent her from taking the children out of the state 
so that he would never see them again, which plrain-
tiff had threatened to do if defendant continued to 
prosecute this appeal or the action against J'arvis. 
(R. 592- 593, 614, 616.) Defendant further testi-
fied that he told the plaintiff that eventually he 
would not permit plaintiff to raise the children and 
that what he meant was that he had faith in the 
law. Plaintiff thereupon goaded him ,and said, ''y·ou 
mean law or no law, you're not going to let me raise 
the children?" The defendant then replied, "I am 
going to take those children. I can't permit this.'' 
( R. 617. ) What man could say otherwise in the face 
of the uncontroverted and admitted facts before 
this court of visitation of cruelty, neglect and moral 
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depravity upon his children? Judge Snow specific-
ally found that the defendant had not gone on the 
premises except for the purpose of ·delivering the 
children after visitation ·and that defendant had 
not abused or molested plaintiff. ( R. 79.) 
Plaintiff, in her brief on appeal from the order 
of Judge Snow at page 7, infers that she lost a job 
since the divorce action at Kennecott Copper Corp-
oration because defendant harrassed her at work 
and expressed concern about disclosing where she 
was presently employed. There is absolutely no evi-
dence in the record that plaintiff did lose her job 
because of any action on the part of defendant or 
that defendant harrassed her at work. Plaintiff's 
counsel expressly stated to the court that he was not 
representing that defendant's actions had anything 
to do with plaintiff's losing her job. (R. 662.) 'The 
only evidence in the record that defendant ever con-
tacted plaintiff at work was a general assertion by 
plaintiff that defendant called her on the telephone, 
without any staten1ent of the number, time, or na-
ture of the calls. ( R. 664.) AI though there is no 
evidence in the record on the matter, we concede 
that defendant did telephone plaintiff at work on a 
few occasions and then only for the purpose of at-
tempting to determine the whereabouts of his child-
ren and arranging to see them. 
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POINT 4. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RESTRAIN-
ING PLAINTIFF FROM TAKING THE CHILDREN 
OUT OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR IN ANY MAN-
NER CAUSING THE CHILDREN TO BE REMOVED 
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Judge Snow in his order restrained plaintiff 
from taking the children out of the State of Utah or 
from in any manner causing the children to be 
removed from the State of Utah for a period in ex-
cess of thirty days without express permission of 
the court, first had and obtained, upon notice to 
defendant an·d a hearing thereon. Plaintiff concedes 
in her brief on 'appeal from the order of Judge Snow 
that the court did not err in issuing this restraining 
order against plaintiff. See, Plaintiff's brief on 
appeal from the order of Judge Snow at Page 15 
wherein plaintiff says, ''The plaintiff does not quar-
rell with the proposition as cited by this court and~ 
universally accepted to the effect that the court 
should m·ain tain control of the minor children of the 
parties and m·aintain said children within the juris-
diction of the court." Plaintiff, having conceded 
that Judge Snow did not err in restraining the plain-
tiff from taking the children out of the state and 
keeping the children subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court, we are not required to answer Point 4 
of the plaintiff's brief so far as it pertains to the 
issuance of the restraining order. Plaintiff, undel~ 
Point 4 of her brief on appeal from the order of 
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Judge Snow, after conceding that issuance of the 
restraining order was not error, proceeds again to 
con1plain because Judge Snow did not issue an order 
restraining defendant from harrassing plaintiff and 
threatening to do her physical harm. (See, Plaintiff's 
brief on 'appeal from the order of Judge Snow, pp. 
14-15.) We have already answered this latter con-
tention under Point 3 of this brief, sttpra, p. 28, 
et seq. The evidence at the hearing before Judge 
Snow was conclusive that defendant has not touched 
plaintiff since prior to the trial of the divorce action 
and tha:t defendant has not threatened plaintiff 
with physical harm or abused her. Based on this 
evidence Judge Snow expressly found that the de-
fendant 'h'a.d not done so, St[pra, p. 28, et seq. 
P01NT 5. 
THE TRIAL CO'URT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF $125.00 ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNEC-
TI·ON WITH THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE SNOW. 
Defendant cross appeals from that part of the 
order of Judge Snow in which Judge Snow awarded 
plaintiff $125.00 attorneys fees in connection with 
the hearing. (See defendant's statement of points 
by way of cross appeal, R. 89.) 
The uncontroverted evidence at the hearing 
before Judge Snow and the findings of Judge Snow 
(R. 78-79) show that, pending defendant's appeal 
to this court from a decree of divorce, defendant was 
forced to resort to the tri,al court as a result of 
plaintiff''s continued misconduct in order to pro-
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teet his children and his rights of visitation under 
circumstances in which plaintiff was denying de-
fendant his rights of visitation, refusing to permit 
the children to see their father over extended periods, 
using the cildren and denying defendant his rights 
of visitation in efforts to extort money from de-
fendant, visiting cruelty upon the children for visit-
ing their father, and visiting moral depra:vity upon 
them. The effect of awarding plaintiff attorneys 
fees against defendant in connection with this hear-
ing is to penalize defendant for resorting to the 
courts to protect his children. In view of his find-
ings Judge Snow could only have been prompted 
to award plaintiff attorneys fees in connection with 
this hearing from a mistaken notion that, every time 
a woman comes into court in connection with a di-
vorce action, she is entitled to attorneys fees re-
gardless of the circumstances of the parties and re-
gardless of the fact that her own wrongdoing brought 
the parties into court. It should be pointed out that 
this litigation has been very costly for defendant 
and that his every effort from the date of filing of 
the complaint by plaintiff down to the present time 
has been for the protection of his children. 
The italics are by the writer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROO·M & HYDE 
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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